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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines whether firm’s ownership structure in Korea changes managers' behavior to 
meet or beat market expectations. We examine whether managers manage earnings upward 
and/or guide analyst expectations downward to avoid negative earnings surprises. By using 
companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, we find that the inclusion of a higher proportion 
of foreign ownership significantly increases the probability to meet or beat market expectations. 
The finding suggests that the firms with higher foreign ownership try to satisfy their foreign 
investors who emphasize current profits by boosting the stock price. We also find that managers 
are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises as large shareholders’ ownership increases. 
The results imply that large shareholders play an internal monitoring role for managers' earnings 
and/or expectations management. In addition, firms with large shareholders’ ownership rely less 
on income-increasing discretionary accruals. Our findings supports the convergence-of-interest 
hypothesis that as the controlling shareholder’s ownership level increases, the interest of the 
controlling shareholder decreases managers’ opportunistic behavior to manage earnings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper investigates (a) whether the ownership structure in Korea is associated with managers' 
behavior to meet or beat market expectations; and (b) whether managers change to use earnings 
management and/or expectations management with the ownership structure. We use foreign 
ownership and large shareholder ownership in order to represent the ownership structure in Korea. 
 
There are three earnings thresholds that managers seek to achieve (1) avoid losses, (2) avoid decreases in 
earnings and (3) avoid negative earnings surprises (Degeorge et al., 1999; Brown et al., 1987; Burgstahler & Eames, 
2006). Recent accounting studies suggest that meeting or beating analyst forecasts is an important benchmark for 
firms and further, firms are likely to manipulate earnings or guide market expectation downward to achieve such 
goal (Matsumoto, 2002; Brown & Caylor, 2005).
1
 Growth stock strategists state that management attempts to be 
conservative in its earnings guidance as a result of how severely stocks are punished when earnings disappoint (Ip, 
1997). The major reasons managers seek to meet or beat market expectations are to build credibility with capital 
markets and to maintain their firms' stock prices (Graham et al., 2005). 
 
We examine the impact of ownership structure on managerial behavior to avoid negative earnings surprises 
in Korea. We expect the firms with higher foreign ownership are more likely to meet or beat market expectations, 
trying to satisfy their foreign investors who emphasize current profits by boosting the stock price. On the other hand, 
we expect the firms with large shareholders are less likely to meet or beat market expectations since the firms tend 
to be less short-term oriented and less sensitive to stock prices because the relationships between managers, who are 
mostly controlling shareholders and stakeholders, are maintained for a long time (Kaplan, 1994). Share ownership in 
                                           
1 Similar to Koh et al. (2008), we use the terms downward forecast guidance and expectations management, synonymously. 
T 
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Korea provides an interesting setting to examine monitoring efforts by documenting managers’ opportunistic 
behavior. The ownership structure of most Korean firms is characterized by controlling shareholders who exercise 
nearly complete control over managers. If large shareholder ownership better aligns managers’ interests with those 
of shareholders, we expect earning management decreases while expectations management increases. 
 
Previous studies have not examined the Korean setting where unique ownership structures are observed 
regarding managers' behavior to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts. Different political and social 
environments are expected to have different incentives in order to meet or beat market expectations; the use of 
earnings management and/or expectations management will vary among countries, depending on ownership 
structures. Our findings showing that decreased earnings management as foreign ownership increases support that 
foreign ownership plays an important outside monitoring role in Korea. We expect managers alternately choose 
expectations management, however, we cannot find any significant result for expectations management as foreign 
ownership increases. Our study contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms, 
supporting the convergence-of-interest hypothesis that as the controlling shareholder’s ownership level increases, 
the interest of the controlling shareholder decreases managers’ opportunistic behavior to manage earnings. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Meeting or Beating Market Expectations 
 
Recent studies find evidence consistent with managers taking action in order to avoid negative earnings 
surprises (Payne & Robb, 2000; Brown, 2001; Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Matsumoto, 2002). Skinner and Sloan 
(2002) report that the stock market reaction to negative earnings surprises tends to be large and asymmetric, 
particularly for growth stocks, suggesting a high cost to missing analysts' expectations. Managers' behavior to avoid 
negative earnings surprises is also explained by the prospect theory.
2
 The prospect theory emphasizes that people 
tend to make a decision focused on loss-aversion rather than risk-aversion because losses hurt more than gains feel 
good. 
 
 
Figure 1: Trend over Time in the Probability of Meeting or Beating Analysts' Expectations in Korea 
 
By utilizing Korean firms with analyst forecasts available in the I/B/E/S/ detail tape, we compute the 
percentage of firm-years, where the actual reported earnings per share meet or beat the consensus forecast one 
month prior to the earnings announcement for each year from 2000 to 2010. Similar to U.S. firms reported in Brown 
(2001), Richardson et al. (1999), and Matsumoto (2002), the percentage of years in which earnings meet or exceed 
analysts' expectations increased from 2000 to 2004. However, Figure 1 demonstrates that the percentage has more or 
less decreased after 2004. Even though the percentage of meeting or beating analysts' expectations has decreased 
recently, that from 2001 to 2008 is almost above 50 percent firm-years. 
 
Generally, Korean investors' propensity to rely on analysts' earnings forecast when they make an 
investment decision is lower than that of U.S. investors. Moreover, analysts in Korea tend to report optimistic 
earnings forecasts, which make the percentage of meeting or beating market expectations lower than other countries. 
                                           
2 According to the prospect theory, investors evaluate firms' performance based on a certain reference point, which are the analysts’ e
arnings forecast in the stock markets. If the reported earnings exceed the reference point, the utility of investors increases. On the oth
er hand, if the reported earnings are lower than the reference point, the utility decreases. 
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However, prior studies find that certain firm characteristics are associated with greater incentives to meet or beat 
market expectations. By using Korean companies, Park and Jeon (2010) discover that firms, whose earnings are 
below analysts' estimates at the end of September, tend to manage their fourth quarter earnings in order to meet or 
beat analysts’ forecasts at the earnings announcements. 
 
2.2 Ownership Structure 
 
2.2.1 Foreign Ownership 
 
The 1997 financial crisis has created a drastic change in corporate governance within Korea. Moreover, 
after the 1997 crisis, foreign investors and institutional investors have increased steadily. Ahn et al. (2005) find that 
analyst coverage is significantly larger, and the analysts’ earnings forecast error is significantly lower for firms with 
higher foreign ownership. They report that foreign investors in Korea do play a role as an effective external 
monitoring system in lessening information asymmetry. Shin et al. (2004) also find that there is a significant positive 
relation between foreign ownership and firm value. Shin and Chang (2005) find that the CEO turnover sensitivity 
with regards to performance increases with foreign ownership, indicating that the effectiveness of monitoring CEOs 
by foreign investors has improved after the economic shock in 1997-1998. On the other hand, Park et al. (2009) find 
that the magnitude of earnings management is positively associated with foreign investors' ownership. Moreover, 
foreign investors pay more attention to the firms' stock prices because they want a near-term portfolio performance. 
To the extent that foreign investors overemphasize near-term profits, managers with higher foreign ownership likely 
perceive greater costs to negative earnings surprises. Therefore, we hypothesize that firms with higher foreign 
ownership are more likely to meet or beat market expectations. 
 
H1a: Firms with higher foreign ownership are more likely to meet or beat market expectations. 
 
2.2.2 Large Shareholder Ownership 
 
The ownership of listed companies in Korea is typically concentrated among large shareholders. When 
ownership is concentrated to a level at which an owner obtains effective control of the firm, the nature of agency 
conflicts is caused between the controlling owners and minority shareholders. According to the entrenchment effect, 
the controlling shareholders benefit from self-dealing transactions in which profits are transferred to the other 
companies they control (Fan & Wong, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). Outside investors may not trust the firm's 
reported earnings because the controlling owner may manipulate earnings for outright expropriation. As a result, the 
loss of credibility in the earnings report lowers the stock price informativeness of the earnings. According to Teoh 
and Wong (1993), market perception regarding the quality of accounting earnings positively affects stock price 
informativeness of earnings. Park (2003) finds that there is a positive relation between large shareholder ownership 
and discretionary accruals by using Korean firms. 
 
On the other hand, the alignment effect implies that high ownership concentration can serve as a credible 
commitment as to which the controlling owner is willing to build a reputation for not expropriating minority 
shareholders (Gomes, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Fan and Wong (2002) report that minority shareholders 
know that if the controlling owner unexpectedly extracts high levels of private benefits when he/she still holds a 
substantial amount of shares, they will discount the stock price accordingly and thus reduce the majority owner's 
share. Once the alignment effects are applied in Korea, as the controlling shareholder’s ownership level increases, 
the interest of the controlling shareholder decreases managers’ opportunistic behavior to manage earnings. 
Accordingly, as for firms with larger shareholder ownership, managers focus on long-term performance rather than 
boost current short-term profits. Therefore, we hypothesize that firms with larger shareholder ownership are less 
likely to meet or beat market expectations. 
 
H1b: Firms with larger shareholder ownership are less likely to meet or beat market expectations. 
 
2.3 Method to Meet or Beat Market Expectations 
 
Prior studies examine two managerial responses in order to meet or beat analyst forecasts: accrual-based 
earnings management and earnings forecast guidance (Fields et al., 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Burgstahler & 
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Eames, 2006). Managing earnings is difficult because auditors and the board of directors scrutinize questionable 
accounting practices. In addition, because accruals reverse in subsequent periods, managers are unlikely to be able to 
use abnormal accruals in order to continually increase earnings above expectations every period (Matsumoto, 2002). 
The passage of the SOX, following the Enron accounting scandal, increased scrutiny on managers’ opportunistic 
behavior to manage earnings. Due to the difficulty in managing earnings in the post-SOX period, managers now 
decrease the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals and increase the use of downward expectations 
management (Koh et al., 2008). While public policies regulating formal disclosures exist, public policies regulating 
informal disclosures are non-existent. Accordingly, in order to communicate with investors or analysts, managers 
favor informal channels, such as press releases, promotional material, speeches, or private conversations (Brown, 
2001). 
 
Ahn et al. (2005) show that Korean firms with higher foreign ownership have larger analyst coverage, but 
lower forecast error and discretionary accruals, indicating that foreign investors do play a role as an effective 
external monitoring system in lessening information asymmetry. Lee and Sohn (2005) report that by using Korean 
firms, foreign and institutional equity ownership significantly increases the level of disclosure. Therefore, we expect 
that firms who meet or beat market expectations rely less on earnings management and more on expectations 
management with higher foreign ownership. On the other hand, we expect that firms with larger shareholder 
ownership decreases both earnings management and expectations management once firms do not have strong 
incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
 
H2a: Firms that meet or beat market expectations are more likely to use upward earnings management. 
H2b: The positive relation between firms who meet or beat market expectations and upward earnings 
management is weakened with higher foreign ownership. 
H2c: The positive relation between firms who meet or beat market expectations and upward earnings 
management is weakened with larger shareholder ownership. 
H3a: Firms that meet or beat market expectations are more likely to use downward expectations management. 
H3b: The positive relation between firms who meet or beat market expectations and downward expectations 
management is strengthened with higher foreign ownership. 
H3c: The positive relation between firms who meet or beat market expectations and downward expectations 
management is weakened with larger shareholder ownership. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
3.1 Estimation Model of Earnings Management 
 
In order to measure earnings management through managers’ accounting discretion, we use the 
performance matched model. It is a remodified version of the modified Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005). They 
argue that discretionary accruals can be affected by firm performance and also suggest including the ROA (return on 
assets) variable in the modified Jones model. The estimation model is shown below in Equation (1). 
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where: tTA Net income－cash flow from operations; 
tS Sales revenue; 
tAR Accounts receivables; 
tPPE Plant, property, and equipment; 
tROA Net income／total assets; 
tA Total assets. 
 
We use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, where in each country for each year, we estimate 
the model for every industry classified by its KSIC (Korean Standard Industrial Classification) code. The sample 
includes only firms with ten or more firm-years of data in the same year-industry in order to ensure sufficient data 
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for parameter estimations. The residual from the estimation model regarding Equation (1) is used to estimate the 
discretionary accruals. We classify firm-years with positive discretionary accruals (POSDA = 1) as having upward 
earnings management, and those with negative discretionary accruals (POSDA = 0) as having downward earnings 
management. 
 
3.2 Estimation Model of Expectations Management 
 
Similar to Matsumoto (2002) and Brown and Higgins (2005), we measure expectations management 
conditional on meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, expectations management is the 
unexpected portion of the earnings forecast (UEF), measured by the difference between the consensus analyst 
forecast (AF) and the expected analyst earnings forecast (E[AF]) for the period: 
 
 ttt AFEAFUEF   (2) 
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where: tAF Mean of analyst earnings forecasts in one month prior to the earnings announcement; 
 tAFE Expected analyst earnings forecasts calculated from Equation (3); 
 tDRIFTE Expected drift estimated from Equation (4); 
tEPS Earnings per share; 
tPRICE Closing stock price. 
 
The expected analyst forecast (E[AF]) in Equation (2) is modeled using a random walk model (EPS from 
the previous period) with drift (E[DRIFT]). Expected drift in Equation (3) is estimated based on prior earnings 
changes, where drift is the earnings change from the previous year. In Equation (4), we use the values of 0  and 
1  only when they can be estimated using at least ten firms in the same year-industry.3 Comparable to Brown and 
Higgins (2005), we exclude the portion of the expected forecast reflected in the cumulative daily excess returns after 
the previous announcement. 
 
If managers attempt to keep expectations low in order to avoid negative earnings surprises, then the actual 
consensus forecast will be less than the estimated forecasts; in Equation (2), UEF will be less than 0. More 
specifically, the negative value of UEF implies that managers tend to guide forecasts downward. We classify firm-
years with negative UEF (DOWN = 1) as having downward expectations management, and those with positive 
UEF(DOWN = 0) as having upward expectations management. 
 
3.3 Tests of Incentives to Beat Market Expectations 
 
To assess whether the ownership structure is associated with incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises, 
we employ the following regression: 
 
  

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n
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 (5) 
 
In Model (5), BEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm’s actual earnings per share exceed the 
mean value of analysts’ earnings forecasts in one month prior to the earnings announcement. In the distribution of 
analyst forecast errors, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) find a larger-than-expected proportion of zero and small 
                                           
3 Furthermore, our model and restriction to ten or more firms is similar to Matsumoto (2002) and Brown and Higgins (2005). 
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positive forecast errors. In addition, not only the academic literature (Bartov et al., 2002; Brown & Caylor, 2005) but 
also the financial press (Morgensen, 2004) discusses that managers try to exactly meet or narrowly beat analyst 
forecasts around the earnings announcement. 
 
We focus on firm characteristics representing corporate ownerships, such as foreign ownerships (FOR) and 
large shareholder ownerships (LARGE). We expect a positive sign of 1 (FOR) in that firms with higher foreign 
ownership are more likely to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts compared to other firms. Because foreign 
investors emphasize near-term profits to maximize stock prices, managers with higher foreign ownership are more 
likely concerned that the negative earnings surprises will lead to significantly lower stock prices. On the other hand, 
we expect the coefficient on LARGE to be negative, representing that firms with larger shareholder ownership are 
less likely to meet or beat expectations. Large shareholders tend to control managerial decisions and are not 
sensitive to current profits. 
 
POSUE is a dummy variable that indicates firm-years with a positive seasonal change in net income. This 
variable controls for the relation between the change in earnings and the forecast error (Matsumoto, 2002). LOSS is 
a dummy variable set to one if the firm reports a net loss in the last year. We expect a negative relation between 
LOSS and its tendency to avoid negative earnings surprises since meeting or beating analysts’ expectations is less 
important for firms that incur losses (Degeorge et al., 1999). SIZE is the logarithm of an equity’s market value to 
control for firm size. Prior research shows that larger firms have less optimistic biases in analysts' forecasts (Brous 
& Kini, 1993; Brown, 1997; Das et al., 1998). Once the less optimistic biases make it easier to meet or beat analysts’ 
expectations, we expect a positive sign for SIZE. GROWTH represents the changes in total assets. Collins and 
Kothari (1989) demonstrate that market reaction to earnings announcements is greater for firms with high-growth 
opportunities. Therefore, we expect a positive sign of GROWTH in that managers of high-growth firms are likely to 
have greater incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
 
3.4 Tests of Methods to Beat Market Expectations 
 
3.4.1 Earnings Management 
 
We examine whether firms who try to meet or beat analyst estimates use upward earnings management and 
whether ownership structure affects the relationship between beating firms and earnings management. We employ 
the following regression: 
 
    

15
7
654321
n
nttttttttt YRGROWTHSIZELARGEFORLARGEFORBEATBEATPOSDA
 (6) 
 
In Model (6), POSDA is set to one if the discretionary accrual estimated from Equation (1) is positive. We 
expect a positive sign for 
1  because firms who meet or beat analyst estimates are more likely to use income-
increasing accruals compared to other firms. We examine whether the positive relationship between BEAT and 
POSDA changes according to firms' ownerships, such as foreign ownership and large shareholders’ ownership. We 
expect the sign of 
2 (BEAT×FOR) to be negative, demonstrating that foreign ownership improves the effectiveness 
of monitoring managers. As for the coefficient on BEAT×LARGE, we expect it to be negative, representing a decline 
in the use of income-increasing accruals to meet or beat expectations regarding firms with large shareholder 
ownership. 
 
3.4.2 Expectations Management 
 
To assess whether the association between beating firms and the propensity for using downward forecast 
guidance changes according to corporate ownerships in Korea, we employ the following regression: 
 
    
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 (7) 
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In Model (7), DOWN is set to one if UEF is negative. UEF refers to the unexpected forecasts provided by 
subtracting the expected forecast from the consensus of analyst forecasts for the year, as shown in Equation (2). If 
managers attempt to keep expectations low in order to avoid negative earnings surprises, UEF will have a negative 
value because the actual consensus forecast is less than the estimated forecasts. In other words, a negative value 
implies that managers tend to guide forecasts downward. ROA is ratio of net incomet over total asset and N indicates 
the number of individual analysts who issue earnings forecast for each firm. 
 
We expect a positive sign for 1 (BEAT) because firms that meet or beat analyst estimates are more likely 
to use expectations management compared to other firms. The positive sign of 
2 (BEAT×FOR) shows that 
managers rely more on downward forecast guidance rather than income-increasing accruals. We also expect the 
coefficient for BEAT×LARGE to be negative, representing a decline in the use of downward forecast guidance in 
order to meet or beat expectations regarding firms with larger ownership. 
 
3.6 Data 
 
The observations are selected from companies listed on the KSE (Korean Stock Exchange) as of December 
31, 2010 that satisfy the following criteria: (1) companies (except financial companies) with their accounts closing 
in December; (2) companies with financial statements and analyst forecasts available in the Fn guide data base and 
the I/B/E/S detail tape, respectively. We use eleven years of data (2000 to 2010) that satisfy the above conditions. 
The value of analyst forecast accuracy exceeding 200% is eliminated. We divide our sample into thirteen groups 
according to the KSIC (Korean Standard Industrial Classification) code; additionally, observations that are in a year- 
industry group with less than 10 samples are deleted in order to reduce bias in the estimating process. Furthermore, 
to minimize the effect of outliers, the top and bottom 1% of independent and dependent variables are winsorized. A 
total of 1,255 firm-year observations are used for the analysis. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Univariate Tests 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The mean value of BEAT is 
0.587, suggesting that approximately 58.7 percent of firm-years meet or beat analyst forecasts during the sample 
periods. As for the methods to beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, the mean value of POSDA is 0.520 and the mean 
DOWN is 0.460. The mean (median) regarding FOR is almost 23 percent (21 percent) percent, whereas the mean 
(median) for LARGE is 36.48 percent (35.29 percent). Our sample shows a relative high mean (median) regarding 
FOR because the I/B/E/S detail tapes from which we obtain the analyst forecast and actual earnings data have 
mostly covered large firms in Korea. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean STD Min Median Max 
Beat analysts’ forecasts BEAT 0.587 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Methods to beat analysts' 
forecasts 
POSDA 0.520 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DOWN 0.460 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Ownership 
FOR(%) 23.276 16.982 0.000 20.687 65.181 
LARGE(%) 36.480 15.972 5.810 35.290 86.620 
Control variables 
POSUE 0.635 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LOSSt-1 0.036 0.187 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 27.566 1.634 22.851 27.621 30.391 
GROWTH 0.120 0.177 -0.462 0.095 1.155 
ROA 0.080 0.059 -0.177 0.070 0.278 
N 5.026 5.097 1.000 3.000 41.000 
BEAT=1 if actual EPSt ≥ mean of analyst EPS forecast in 1 month before earnings announcement, otherwise 0; POSDA=1 if DA≥0, otherwise 
0(DA is residual value of performance matched model); DOWN=1 if UEF<0, otherwise 0(UEF=mean of analyst EPS forecast-expected analyst 
EPS forecast defined as equation (3)); FOR=foreign ownership; LARGE=large shareholders’ ownership; POSUE=1 if net incomet≥net incomet-1, 
otherwise 0; LOSS t-1=1 if net incomet-1<0, otherwise 0; SIZE=log of market value of equity; GROWTH=chages of total asset; ROA=ratio of net 
incomet over total asset; N=number of individual analysts who issue earnings forecast for each firm. 
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In Table 2, we compare the difference between BEAT and NO BEAT firm-years. There is a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) between the mean value of POSDA between firms who meet or beat analyst estimates, 0.579 
and that of firms who miss analyst estimates, 0.433. The mean value of DOWN for firms who meet or beat market 
expectations, 0.470, is relatively higher than DOWN for firms who do not beat market expectations, 0.446. Thus, we 
find support for the conjecture that firms who meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts use both upward earnings 
management and downward expectations management. 
 
As for the foreign ownership variable, the mean (median) regarding FOR for firms who meet or beat 
market expectations, 24.49 percent (21.61 percent), is relatively higher than FOR for firms who do not beat market 
expectations, 21.13 percent (18.23 percent). On the other hand, the mean (median) of LARGE for BEAT firms, 35.48 
percent (35.20 percent), is relatively lower than LARGE for NO BEAT firms, 37.83 percent (35.69 percent). 
Therefore, we can conjecture that firms with higher foreign ownership are more likely to meet or beat market 
expectations while firms with greater large shareholder ownership are less likely to meet or beat analyst estimates. 
 
Table 2: Beating Analysts’ Earnings Forecast 
Variable 
BEAT (N = 737) NO BEAT (N = 518) Mean diff. Median diff. 
Mean Median Mean Median t-value z-value 
POSDA 0.579  1.000  0.433  0.000  4.29*** 4.25*** 
DOWN 0.470  0.000  0.446  0.000  0.48 0.48 
FOR 24.402  21.568  21.673  18.912  3.24*** 3.21*** 
LARGE 35.594  35.130  37.746  35.800  -2.43** -2.03** 
POSUE 0.659  1.000  0.601  1.000  2.22** 2.21** 
LOSSt-1 0.029  0.000  0.047  0.000  -1.89* -2.01** 
SIZE 27.540  27.582  27.604  27.667  0.55 0.38 
GROWTH 0.126  0.097  0.110  0.092  1.04 1.35 
ROA 0.086  0.076  0.071  0.065  3.74*** 4.03*** 
N 5.076  3.000  4.956  3.000  1.05 0.68 
BEAT=1 if actual EPSt ≥ mean of analyst EPS forecast in 1 month before earnings announcement, otherwise 0; POSDA=1 if DA≥0, otherwise 
0(DA is residual value of performance matched model); DOWN=1 if UEF<0, otherwise 0(UEF=mean of analyst EPS forecast-expected analyst 
EPS forecast defined as equation (3)); FOR=foreign ownership; LARGE=large shareholders’ ownership; POSUE=1 if net incomet≥net incomet-1, 
otherwise 0; LOSS t-1=1 if net incomet-1<0, otherwise 0; SIZE=log of market value of equity; GROWTH=chages of total asset; ROA=ratio of net 
incomet over total asset; N=number of individual analysts who issue earnings forecast for each firm. 
 
Table 3 presents the correlations between each variable. BEAT demonstrates a significant positive 
correlation with POSDA (0.131, p < 0.001). There is a positive association between BEAT and DOWN, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.015 (p = 0.632). In the univariate analysis, we cannot assert whether firms who meet or 
beat market expectations increase the downward forecast guidance. However, managers of BEAT firms have strong 
incentives to increase earnings management. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1)BEAT 
1 0.131 
<.0001 
0.015 
0.632 
0.096 
0.001 
-0.072 
0.015 
0.066 
0.027 
-0.060 
0.044 
0.016 
0.585 
0.032 
0.291 
0.111 
0.000 
0.030 
0.309 
(2)POSDA 
 1 -0.110 
0.001 
0.052 
0.000 
0.074 
<.0001 
0.063 
<.0001 
-0.113 
<.0001 
0.022 
0.113 
0.159 
<.0001 
0.255 
<.0001 
0.033 
0.153 
(3)DOWN 
  1 -0.074 
0.017 
0.026 
0.399 
-0.194 
<.0001 
-0.067 
0.032 
-0.131 
<.0001 
-0.120 
0.000 
-0.150 
<.0001 
-0.112 
0.000 
(4)FOR 
   1 -0.127 
<.0001 
0.023 
0.077 
-0.130 
<.0001 
0.591 
<.0001 
0.039 
0.003 
0.190 
<.0001 
0.403 
<.0001 
(5)LARGE 
    1 -0.017 
0.214 
-0.096 
<.0001 
-0.058 
<.0001 
0.076 
<.0001 
0.092 
<.0001 
-0.218 
<.0001 
(6)POSUE 
     1 0.138 
<.0001 
0.083 
<.0001 
0.157 
<.0001 
0.326 
<.0001 
0.101 
<.0001 
(7)LOSSt-1 
      1 -0.215 
<.0001 
-0.079 
<.0001 
-0.430 
<.0001 
-0.045 
0.048 
 (8)SIZE 
       1 0.189 
<.0001 
0.293 
<.0001 
0.560 
<.0001 
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Table 3 cont. 
(9)GROWTH 
        1 0.251 
<.0001 
0.078 
0.001 
(10)ROA 
         1 0.178 
<.0001 
(11)N           1 
BEAT=1 if actual EPSt ≥ mean of analyst EPS forecast in 1 month before earnings announcement, otherwise 0; POSDA=1 if DA≥0, otherwise 
0(DA is residual value of performance matched model); DOWN=1 if UEF<0, otherwise 0(UEF=mean of analyst EPS forecast-expected analyst 
EPS forecast defined as equation (3)); FOR=foreign ownership; LARGE=large shareholders’ ownership; POSUE=1 if net incomet≥net incomet-1, 
otherwise 0; LOSS t-1=1 if net incomet-1<0, otherwise 0; SIZE=log of market value of equity; GROWTH=chages of total asset; ROA=ratio of net 
incomet over total asset;N=number of individual analysts who issue earnings forecast for each firm. 
 
4.2 Tests of Incentives to Beat Market Expectations 
 
Table 4 reports the logit regression results for Equation (5). Model 1 presents the results using only FOR in 
the logit regression, whereas Model 2 reports the results using LARGE in place of FOR. Model 3 includes both FOR 
and LARGE in the logit regression. In Model 1 and Model 3, the coefficient on FOR is positive and significant, 
suggesting that firms with higher foreign ownership are more likely to meet or exceed market expectations. 
Consistent with H1a, we find that managers with higher foreign ownership have strong incentives to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. Managers with higher foreign ownership are more likely concerned with negative earnings 
surprises because such surprises will lead to significantly lower stock prices and further, adversely affect foreign 
owners' near-term portfolio performance. The significant negative coefficient on LARGE in Model 1 and Model 3 
supports H1b-firms with larger shareholder ownership are less likely to meet or beat market expectations. Due to the 
notion that large shareholders are not sensitive to the drop in stock prices, managers with larger shareholder 
ownership perceive lower costs compared to missing analysts' forecasts. 
 
Table 4: Meeting or Beating Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by Ownership 
  


15
7
6514321
n
nttttttt YRGROWTHSIZELOSSPOSUELARGEFORBEAT
 
Variables Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Estimate 
Wald chi-
square 
Estimate 
Wald chi-
square 
Estimate 
Wald chi-
square 
Intercept  1.277 0.05 0.051 0.00 1.071 0.66 
FOR ＋ 0.004 5.77**   0.008 4.03** 
LARGE －   -0.010 7.33*** -0.009 5.58** 
POSUE ＋ 0.127 4.69** 0.269 4.45** 0.266 4.34** 
LOSSt-1 － 0.315 1.13 -0.432 1.88 -0.371 1.38 
SIZE ＋ 0.046 0.60 -0.005 0.02 -0.050 1.18 
GROWTH ＋ 0.355 2.69 0.656 3.34* 0.653 3.32* 
YR  included included included 
N 1,255 1,255 1,255 
Log Likelihood  54.14*** 55.68*** 59.74*** 
BEAT=1 if actual EPSt ≥ mean of analyst EPS forecast in 1 month before earnings announcement, otherwise 0; FOR=foreign ownership; 
LARGE=large shareholders’ ownership; POSUE=1 if net incomet≥net incomet-1, otherwise 0; LOSS t-1=1 if net incomet-1<0, otherwise 0; 
SIZE=log of market value of equity; GROWTH=chages of total asset; YR=dummy variable if each year. Notes: *, **, *** represent the 
significances at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Tests of Methods to Beat Market Expectations 
 
Table 5 presents the regression results for Equation (6). Consistent with prior researches (Brown, 2001; 
Matsumoto, 2002; Brown & Caylor, 2005), which find that firms meeting or beating analyst estimates generally use 
accrual-based earnings management, the findings indicate a significantly positive association between BEAT and 
POSDA. We find a significantly negative sign for 
2 (BEAT×FOR) (-0.016, p = 0.040), suggesting that firms who 
meet or beat market expectations decrease the use of income-increasing accruals with higher foreign ownership. The 
negative sign of 
2 (BEAT×LARGE) (-0.013, p = 0.066) suggests that firms who meet or beat market expectations 
also decrease in their upward earnings management as larger shareholder ownership increases. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2014 Volume 30, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1072 The Clute Institute 
Table 5: Earnings Management to Meet or Beat Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by Ownership 
    

15
7
654321
n
nttttttttt YRGROWTHSIZELARGEFORLARGEFORBEATBEATPOSDA
 
Variables Predicted sign Estimate Wald chi-square Estimate Wald chi-square 
Intercept  4.754 11.42*** 4.242 12.23*** 
BEAT ＋ 0.661 9.74*** 0.576 4.02** 
BEAT×FOR ＋/－ -0.016 4.24**   
BEAT×LARGE －   -0.013 3.37* 
FOR ＋ 0.008 1.68 -0.005 2.13 
LARGE ＋ 0.001 0.22 0.002 0.22 
SIZE ＋ -0.190 15.06*** -0.151 12.70*** 
GROWTH ＋ 0.334 0.89 0.340 1.35 
YR  included included 
N 1,255 1,255 
Log Likelihood 58.63*** 41.37*** 
 
Table 6 reports the results on the relation between beating market expectations and expectations 
management as well as the changes in its relation with the ownership structure in Korea. As expected, we find a 
positive sign for the coefficient on BEAT (0.327, p = 0.042), representing that firms meeting or beating analysts' 
forecasts utilize downward forecast guidance. Our results are consistent with Brown and Higgins (2005), which 
show that, in the case of Korea, the probability that the current earnings meet or beat analyst estimates and DOWN = 
1 for periods from 1991 to 2000 are almost 14.66. Moreover, our findings support the result of Matsumoto (2002), 
which show managers as to who beat analysts' estimates using both earnings management and expectations 
management. 
 
Table 6: Expectations Management to Meet or Beat Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by Ownership 
    

17
9
87654321
n
ntttttttttt YRNGROWTHROASIZELARGEFORLARGEFORBEATBEATDOWN
 
Variables Predicted sign Estimate Wald chi-square Estimate Wald chi-square 
Intercept  6.061 20.05*** 7.430 22.74*** 
BEAT ＋ 0.327 4.13** 0.619 3.31* 
BEAT×FOR ＋/－ -0.007 1.35   
BEAT×LARGE －   -0.009 1.21 
FOR ＋ 0.010 5.65** 0.009 3.89** 
LARGE ＋ 0.003 0.81 0.007 1.44** 
SIZE ＋ -0.191 14.59*** -0.233 17.49*** 
ROA ＋ -7.581 65.78*** -8.298 51.03*** 
GROWTH ＋ 0.119 0.16 -0.544 1.61 
N ＋ 0.000 0.03 -0.008 0.27 
YR  included included 
N 1,255 1,255 
Log Likelihood 194.59*** 117.46*** 
POSDA=1 if DA≥0, otherwise 0(DA is residual value of performance matched model; DOWN=1 if UEF<0, otherwise 0(UEF=mean of analyst 
EPS forecast-expected analyst EPS forecast defined as equation (3)); BEAT=1 if actual EPSt ≥ mean of analyst EPS forecast in 1 month before 
earnings announcement, otherwise 0; FOR=foreign ownership; LARGE=large shareholders’ ownership; POSUE=1 if net incomet≥net incomet-1, 
otherwise 0; LOSS t-1=1 if net incomet-1<0, otherwise 0; SIZE=log of market value of equity; ROA=ratio of net incomet over total asset; 
GROWTH=chages of total asset; N=number of individual analysts who issue earnings forecast for each firm; YR=dummy variable of each year. 
Notes: *, **, *** represent the significances at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Our results find that firms who try to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts use both earnings 
management and expectations management, consistent with prior researches (Matsumoto, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; 
Brown & Higgins, 2001). However, some may be concerned with whether the proxies that measure meeting or 
beating market expectations are capturing earnings and/or expectations management, or whether these trends result 
from some other phenomenon. To provide construct validity for our proxies, we conduct an additional analysis using 
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“suspect firms.” Firms exactly meeting or slightly beating the targets due to a greater likelihood of managerial 
intervention in earnings and/or expectations management are expected to be observed here. We define this small 
beater (SMBEAT) as a dummy variable, which is set to one if the firm’s actual earnings per share exceed the 
analysts’ forecasts by 100 won per share or less.4 To assess whether small beaters increase earnings and/or 
expectations management with corporate ownership in Korea, we employ the following regressions. 
 
    

15
7
654321
n
nttttttttt YRGROWTHSIZELARGEFORLARGEFORSMBEATSMBEATPOSDA
 
 
    

17
9
87654321
n
ntttttttttt YRNGROWTHROASIZELARGEFORLARGEFORSMBEATSMBEATDOWN
 
 
where SMBEAT = 1 if 0 ≤ (EPSt-mean analyst forecast) ≤ ₩100 otherwise 0 
 
In Panel A of Table 7, we find significant positive associations between SMBEAT and POSDA (0.411, p = 
0.05). These findings suggest that managers of SMBEAT firms seek to avoid negative earnings surprises by 
increasing the accruals. However, the negative sign of SMBEAT×FOR explains that the positive association between 
SMBEAT and POSDA decreases as foreign ownership increases. These findings suggest that SMBEAT firms are 
unlikely to use earnings management if foreign ownership is high. On the other hand, no such effects are found 
regarding large shareholder ownership. Panel B of Table 7 presents the estimation result for expectations 
management of SMBEAT firms with ownership structure. Our results present that the coefficient of SMBEAT is 
significantly positive, representing that firms who exactly meet or slightly beat expectations use downward forecast 
guidance. Therefore, these findings expand the result of Brown and Higgins (2005) in that firms that meet or slightly 
beat expectations increases the likelihood of using downward expectations management in Korea. However, the 
positive associations between SMBEAT and DOWN do not change with ownership structures, such as foreign 
ownership and large shareholder ownership. 
 
Table 7: Earnings Management and Expectations Management for Firms to Meet or Slightly Beat Market Expectations 
Panel A: Earnings Management 
    

15
7
654321
n
nttttttttt YRGROWTHSIZELARGEFORLARGEFORSMBEATSMBEATPOSDA
 
Variables Predicted sign Estimate Wald chi-square Estimate Wald chi-square 
Intercept  4.740 21.53*** 6.191 33.72*** 
SMBEAT ＋ 0.411 3.83* 0.189 0.36 
SMBEAT×FOR ＋/－ -0.012 2.82*   
SMBEAT×LARGE －   0.002 0.09 
FOR ＋ 0.010 3.71* 0.017 17.85*** 
LARGE ＋ 0.002 0.34 0.000 0.01 
SIZE ＋ -0.231 25.80*** -0.323 46.12*** 
GROWTH ＋ 0.406 1.33 1.482 15.40*** 
YR  included included 
N 1,255 1,255 
Log Likelihood 51.33*** 41.37*** 
Panel B: Expectations Management 
    

17
9
87654321
n
ntttttttttt YRNGROWTHROASIZELARGEFORLARGEFORSMBEATSMBEATDOWN
 
Variables Predicted sign Estimate Wald chi-square Estimate Wald chi-square 
Intercept  7.161  21.79*** 7.151  21.74*** 
SMBEAT ＋ 0.561  6.42** 0.682  4.38** 
SMBEAT×FOR ＋/－ -0.006  0.63   
SMBEAT×LARGE －   -0.007  0.78 
FOR ＋ 0.013  5.33** 0.010  4.87** 
                                           
4 Won is Korean currency. 
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Table 7 cont. 
LARGE ＋ 0.000  0.03 0.004  0.55 
SIZE ＋ -0.241  19.13*** -0.242  19.37*** 
ROA ＋ -7.807  50.08*** -7.868  50.92*** 
GROWTH ＋ -0.718  2.92* -0.697  2.76* 
N ＋ -0.011  0.49 -0.010  0.44 
YR  included included 
N 1,255 1,255 
Log Likelihood 130.73*** 130.87*** 
SMBEAT=1 if 0 ≤ (EPSt-mean analyst forecast) ≤ ₩100 otherwise 0; POSDA=1 if DA≥0, otherwise 0(DA is residual value of performance 
matched model); DOWN=1 if UEF<0, otherwise 0(UEF=mean of analyst EPS forecast-expected analyst EPS forecast defined as equation (3)); 
FOR=foreign ownership; LARGE=large shareholders’ ownership; POSUE=1 if net incomet≥net incomet-1, otherwise 0; LOSS t-1=1 if net incomet-
1<0, otherwise 0; SIZE=log of market value of equity; GROWTH=chages of total asset; ROA=ratio of net incomet over total asset; N=number of 
individual analysts who issue earnings forecast for each firm. Notes: *, **, *** represent the significances at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
However, we cannot find significant results for each coefficient of both BEAT×FOR and BEAT×LARGE. 
We expect firms who meet or beat analysts' estimates rely more on downward forecasts rather than on earnings 
management with higher foreign ownership because foreign investors limit managers’ ability to acquire private 
control benefits. However, our findings indicate that the changes in ownership structure in Korea do not affect 
managerial behavior to meet or beat market expectations. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Our studies investigate whether managers change their behavior related to meeting or beating expectations, 
depending on the ownership structure in Korea. We also examine whether the ownership structure changes meeting 
or beating market expectations by means of earnings management and/or expectations management. 
 
First, we discover that firms with higher foreign ownership are more likely to meet or beat market 
expectations while firms with larger shareholder ownership are less likely to meet or beat analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Our results portray that managers perceive greater costs to missing analysts' earnings forecasts since 
foreign owners emphasize current-term profits. Our findings suggest that large shareholders’ ownership has an 
important influence on internal monitoring efforts on manager’s earnings and/or expectations management. 
Furthermore, our results show managers with large shareholders’ ownership tend to purse long-term firm value 
rather than near-term profits since large shareholders ownership is beneficial once it better aligns managers’ interests 
with those of shareholders. 
 
Second, firms that meet or beat market expectations rely less on income-increasing discretionary accruals 
with higher foreign ownership and larger shareholder ownership. These findings suggest that foreign ownership 
plays an important outside monitoring role in Korea such that managers decrease earnings management as foreign 
ownership increases. In addition, media attention focuses primarily on managers’ use of accounting discretion, 
resulting in the decrease of managers’ opportunistic behavior for their own interests. As for firms with higher 
foreign ownership, we expect, given the relative difficulty of managing earnings upward, managers are relatively 
more likely to use forecast guidance because the regulation of forecast guidance is far less rigorous than that of 
earnings management. However, we cannot find any significant results for expectations management as foreign 
ownership increases. 
 
Our study represents an initial attempt to examine the relationships between ownership structure in Korea 
and managers' behavior in order to meet or beat market expectations. Although the earnings management literature 
is relatively well developed, no previous study has examined the relationship between ownership structure in Korea 
and managers' behavior in order to avoid negative earnings surprises. The results provide additional evidence for the 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis that as the controlling shareholder’s ownership level increases, the interest of the 
controlling shareholder decreases managers’ opportunistic behavior to manage earnings. The results add to the 
growing body of literature that finds a link between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of 
earnings management as well as expectations management. 
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